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ABSTRACT
In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an 
ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory con-
taining a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that 
best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant 
situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. 
I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and em-
pathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that 
both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. 
Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care 
principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic 
right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that 
can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads 
to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value 
of biodiversity.
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Introduction
In this article my ambitious goal is to construct a coherent 
ethical system that is capable of dealing with all relevant issues 
in principle-based animal ethics. The basic line of reasoning of 
this construction goes as follows: I start with a factual property 
of the world, which ignites a moral intuition or emotion, i.e. a 
direct moral response or judgment that has no further rational 
justification. Then, in a process of reflection, this intuition is 
translated into a universalized ethical principle, where “uni-
versalized” means: “relevant to all morally similar situations.” 
Sometimes different moral intuitions will mutually support 
each other, resulting in a set of coherent universalized ethical 
principles. But sometimes we encounter a new fact or situation 
that again ignites another moral intuition or emotion, which 
might be in contradiction with our constructed set of universal-
ized ethical principles. To solve this conflict or moral dilemma, 
we can either change the ethical principles, or introduce a new 
ethical principle that trumps the previous ethical principles in 
that particular situation. This new ethical principle needs to be 
universalized as well to all relevantly similar situations. 
This process continues: we again test the constructed coher-
ent set of universalized principles in new situations, and if we 
encounter a moral dilemma, we look for further refinements. 
Eventually, all situations and all facts that ignite moral intu-
itions should be covered, and we move to a consistent ethical 
system of hierarchical universalized principles, where some 
principles trump others. In other words, we reach a theory in 
“reflective equilibrium” (Rawls, 1971), which means that our 
strongest moral intuitions and ethical principles are coherent 
(mutually supporting each other).
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This approach can be compared with solving a crossword 
puzzle. The descriptions of the words are the analogues of ob-
jective facts in the world. The white boxes refer to the possible 
situations, the individual letters represent the intuitive moral 
judgments in particular situations. The words correspond with 
the universalized ethical principles (applied to all similar situa-
tions), and these words mutually support each other and form a 
coherent solution to the puzzle. So let’s derive a coherent ethic 
of animal equality, starting from the most basic, indisputable 
objective facts and moral intuitions.
The construction of a coherent system
Fact 1: All sentient beings have a well-being and they value 
their own well-being (and everything that contributes to well-
being). Sentient beings are beings that have and can subjective-
ly feel interests. Things subjectively matter to them, meaning 
first of all that the individual has a mechanism (i.e. a complex 
functioning nervous system) that enables the individual to have 
representations of their bodies and environments. These repre-
sentations can have intentionality, resulting in qualitative expe-
riences (phenomenological sensations or qualia). For example: 
through my fingers I can feel this book. I know the difference 
between this feeling and an absence of feeling, for example 
when my fingers are anaesthetized. However, just before I 
paid attention to this feeling of touch, I was not aware of it. 
There was an unconscious neural activity (but no anesthesia). 
Only after I focused on my fingertips, it became a conscious 
experience or “quale” of touch. Now, qualia are often neutral. 
I don’t feel an urge to avoid touching books. But other qualia 
are affective in nature; they are evaluated as being positive or 
negative. A needle in my finger generates a quale that I wish to 
avoid. This quale is called pain and it generates an urge in me. 
Once a quale becomes an affective mental state (i.e. a positive 
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or negative feeling or emotion such as pain, distress, joy,…), 
well-being comes into play. These feelings are related to inter-
ests or needs: they are nothing but subjective experiences of 
(un)satisfied interests. Fear, pain, and frustration indicate that 
the needs for respectively safety, bodily integrity, and freedom 
are not satisfied. 
Moral intuition 1: Impartiality is morally important. We 
can consider a two-step process to increase impartiality, from 
rational egoism to extended contractualism. A rational egoist 
would strive for a contractarian ethic (cf. Thomas Hobbes), 
where all rational beings (i.e. beings with whom one can nego-
tiate) of equal power will become part of the moral community, 
because those rational egoists gain mutual advantages through 
the social contract. However, in a first step to extend impartial-
ity, Rawls (1971) used the method of the veil of ignorance to 
delete the second condition of equality of power. He arrives at 
a contractualist ethic that also includes rational people in de-
pendent or weaker positions (minorities, future generations,...). 
The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment, whereby you 
imagine that you will be born as a rational agent, but you don’t 
know who you will be. You can determine the moral and po-
litical laws, based on your knowledge of the natural laws. I 
would suggest a second step to extend impartiality, whereby 
we delete the condition of rationality. Imagine that you might 
be any object or entity in the world, but you don’t know who 
or what you might be. For complete impartiality, you have to 
imagine you could be a planet, an electron, a pig in the year 
3000 or anything you can think of. How would you like that en-
tity to be treated? If you were non-sentient, this question would 
not matter to you, because nothing done to you will influence 
your well-being (you would not have a well-being). The kind 
of treatment becomes important only for those beings whose 
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well-being can be influenced by moral agents. Non-sentient en-
tities should not be taken into account in this moral evaluation. 
So the least arbitrary and most impartial thing to do is to delete 
both conditions (of rationality and equality of power), which is 
what Rowlands (1998) argued, from which it follows that well-
being still remains important.
Universal ethical principle 1: All moral agents should 
strive towards impartiality in all situations, and should take 
everyone’s well-being into consideration in an impartial way. 
Moral agents are people who are able to understand the notion 
of impartiality.
Fact 2: Empathy is meaningful for all and only for sentient 
beings (feeling empathy for non-sentient beings such as teddy 
bears would be a kind of projection of emotions). Empathy is 
the capacity to experience or sample the emotions of others. 
This emotional response occurs when the perspective (frame of 
reference) of the other is taken.
Moral intuition 2: Compassion (empathy plus the desire to 
alleviate the suffering of the other) is a virtue.
Universal ethical principle 2: All moral agents should de-
velop compassion in all situations (hence also towards all sen-
tient beings). Moral agents are people who are able to develop 
compassion, are able to understand the virtue of compassion, 
and are able to help others. Those moral agents should try to 
improve the well-being of others.
The above two universal ethical principles are coherent with 
each other, and give a rational and emotional basis of the moral 
importance of sentience. They are based on contractualism, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. The coherence gets even 
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stronger when we consider the following moral intuitions. A) 
Mental capacities (self-consciousness, rationality,…) are mor-
ally important. They are very special, complex, and vulnerable, 
hence worth protecting. B) Babies and mentally disabled hu-
mans have rights because they have something morally impor-
tant. They have a higher moral status than human egg cells, 
skin cells, dead human bodies, plants, or stones. Together with 
the fact that sentience is the only mental capacity that mentally 
disabled persons have in common with other humans, it fol-
lows from A and B that sentience is important. The link be-
tween rights and sentience is also not farfetched: rights protect 
interests; feelings detect interests. 
This gives us a strong coherent case for the moral relevance 
of sentience. It is a scientific question (i.e. a matter of fact) 
what entity has a well-being and how its well-being can be 
influenced. We can briefly compare this moral relevance of 
sentience with the moral irrelevance of a criterion such as the 
species Homo sapiens. First, the species is one of the many bio-
logical classifications, thus it is arbitrary to pick a specific spe-
cies and not a specific population, genus, family, order, class,… 
Second, the definition of a species is very complicated. One 
of the definitions refers to a set of individuals who could get 
fertile offspring. But reference to fertility and offspring is very 
artificial and farfetched when it comes to determining who has 
rights. Third, science will never be able to determine wheth-
er a human-chimpanzee hybrid, a human-animal chimera, an 
ancestor (Australopithecus, Homo habilis,…) or a genetically 
modified humanoid should still be called Homo sapiens. The 
boundaries are fuzzy. Fourth, all species are temporally relat-
ed to all other species in a similar way, as populations can be 
spatially related in a ring species (a ring species consists of a 
spatial spreading of populations, where A can get fertile off-
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spring with B, B with C, but C not with A). Fifth, if the moral 
status of a species is determined by genes or bodily appearance, 
then it is also very arbitrary to pick out those genes or bodily 
characteristics and not others (such as skin color,…). We are 
not responsible for our genes, so it would be a violation of the 
desert principle if we based moral status on genes. In summary, 
the species boundary is too arbitrary, artificial, and abstract to 
be morally relevant. 
So far, our ethic is not yet unambiguous and clear. We ob-
serve that there are different sentient beings, and multiple ways 
to influence their well-being (for example: increasing every-
one’s well-being a little bit versus increasing the well-being 
of one individual a lot). So what is a just distribution of well-
being? First of all, we value parsimony and simplicity. One 
simple solution would be to add the levels of well-being of all 
sentient beings for a specific time interval, and then take the 
sum over all times. Then we could try to maximize this sum. 
This is sum-utilitarianism. But there are also other simple op-
tions, such as trying to maximize the well-being of the worst-
off sentient being (the one with the lowest level of well-being). 
This is maximin-utilitarianism. However, according to many 
people, both sum-utilitarianism and maximin-utilitarianism 
have some counterintuitive implications. With sum-utilitarian-
ism, it is morally good to sacrifice one individual in order to 
increase the well-beings of others, or to kill one individual and 
replace him with another sentient being, or to keep on breeding 
sentient beings in order to increase the sum of well-being. The 
latter is known as the “repugnant conclusion” (Parfit, 1984): 
an overpopulated world with a trillion individuals with a well-
being slightly above zero, might be better than a world with 
only a thousand individuals who have a satisfying high level of 
well-being. Our moral intuitions go against these conclusions. 
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These conclusions can be avoided by introducing a level of risk 
aversion.
Fact 3: There are many sentient being, and some beings can 
be worse-off than others. This fact implies that from behind 
the impartial veil of ignorance, how to maximize your well-
being becomes a game of chance. Mathematically, sum-utili-
tarianism implies that the expectation value of your well-being 
will be maximized. But you have to be aware that there is a 
risk that you might be born as one of the worst-off individuals. 
For example: two individuals might have well-beings equal to 
10 and 100, so the expectation value will be equal to 55 (the 
average). In sum-utilitarianism, this situation would be equal 
to the situation where those two beings both have a well-being 
of 55. The problem is that in the first situation, you might end 
up as the person with level 10. When much is at stake, most 
moral agents have a risk aversion (need for safety—to play it 
safe), and in this game of chance, this means that they would 
not opt for sum-utilitarianism, but to some kind of prioritarian-
ism: giving priority to increases of well-being of the worst-off 
positions. Therefore they prefer the second situation. If you 
have maximum risk aversion (a maximum need for safety), 
you would take the maximin-utilitarian strategy (maximiz-
ing the minimum/lowest well-being), giving all priority to the 
worst-off position, because you are so worried at becoming this 
worst-off individual. If you have zero risk aversion, you are a 
sum-utilitarist. A high but not maximum level of risk aversion 
would result in a prioritarianism that is in between maximin-
utilitarianism and sum-utilitarianism. We could call this ‘quasi-
maximin prioritarianism’.
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Moral intuition 3: A (high) level of risk aversion is good 
(especially when much of your well-being is at stake; then most 
people are risk averse).
Universal ethical principle 3: Quasi-maximin prioritari-
anism should be applied in all situations. Mathematically, this 
principle can be expressed as the maximization of the expec-
tation value of a weighted average of qualities of life of all 
sentient beings. Let’s clarify this expression. The maximization 
runs over all available choices from behind a veil of ignorance. 
Each choice gives a different world-history. In each choice, we 
only consider the sentient beings that exist in that world-history 
(in the present or the future), and only those sentient-beings 
whose well-being can be influenced by our choice. The expec-
tation value is in case the outcomes of qualities of life are un-
certain (then it becomes a double game of chance: first, from 
behind the veil of ignorance you don’t know which one of the 
possible beings you will be, and second, you don’t know ex-
actly what qualities of life those possible beings will get). The 
weighted average is over all sentient beings that exist in the 
present or will exist in the future, whereby the lowest qualities 
of life get the highest weight factors, resulting in a higher prior-
ity to maximize those lowest positions. So it is a priority aver-
aged well-being that matters. (When the lowest position gets 
the weight 1 and the others 0, then we obtain maximin-utilitar-
ianism. When all qualities of life get an equal weight factor, we 
arrive at sum-utilitarianism.) The quality of life refers to the to-
tal preferred well-being of an individual over his/her complete 
lifespan. This preferred well-being is the value that one would 
ascribe to living the complete life of that individual, when look-
ing from the most impartial point of view, e.g. from behind a 
veil of ignorance. The quality of life contains everything that 
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would matter to you, all the preferences that you would have, if 
you would live the life of that sentient being.
Quasi-maximin prioritarianism has some elegant features. It 
avoids the abovementioned objections against sum-utilitarian-
ism, and also a lot of objections against animal ethics. First, 
consider the idea of painlessly killing someone (for example in 
his sleep). From behind the veil of ignorance, you cannot prefer 
such killing, even if you are not aware that you will be killed. 
This means that a sentient being should now be defined as a be-
ing that has already developed the capacity to feel and has not 
yet permanently lost this capacity. Indeed, quality of life starts 
from the first feeling and ends at the last feeling. 
Next, take the problem of replaceability. Is it allowed to kill 
a sentient being (painlessly), and then let another sentient be-
ing be born? This happens when we breed and slaughter cows. 
If we kill a sentient being, his quality of life will be e.g. 5, 
whereas it would have been 10 otherwise (when he lives a full 
life). So in a first option, one individual will have a life with 
total well-being equal to 5, and a second one will have at most 
level 10. In a second option, we will have only one being, with 
level 10. From behind the veil of ignorance, in the first option 
you have probability ½ to have a low quality of life equal to 
5. In the second option, you are sure you will have level 10. A 
sum-utilitarist would say that the first option is better, because 
the total quality of life equals 15, which is higher than 10 in the 
second situation. But being risk averse, I would prefer the sec-
ond situation, and that’s also what our prioritarian theory says. 
Therefore, sentient beings are not replaceable. Also the repug-
nant conclusion (the idea to keep on breeding sentient beings 
until their qualities of life are about to drop below zero), can 
be avoided, by simply noting that behind the veil of ignorance 
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you would not prefer an overpopulated world where everyone 
has a very low quality of life. So quasi-maximin prioritarian-
ism avoids the often heard argument that breeding livestock 
animals is good, because they owe their lives to the breeders, 
and it is better to live a life on a farm than not to be born at all. 
According to our prioritarianism, the choice is not between an 
existing life on a farm versus a non-existing life, because as 
said above: in each choice, we only consider the sentient beings 
that exist in that world-history.
Another famous problem in animal ethics is the lifeboat di-
lemma (e.g. Regan, 1983). Suppose there are different sentient 
beings in a lifeboat, but we cannot save everyone. Those be-
ings can have different expected life expectancies, but they can 
also differ in complexity (richness) of emotions, the amounts 
of needs, the levels of satisfaction when needs are satisfied,… 
This means that the potential qualities of life can differ amongst 
the different sentient beings in the lifeboat. The potential quali-
ties of life between a (mentally normal) human, a dog, or a 
frog can differ. This influences our choices whom to rescue. As 
Regan argued, it might be required to sacrifice the dogs first, 
because they experience a less rich life than the humans. How-
ever, Regan said that the life of one human would trump the 
lives of a million and more dogs. According to our prioritarian-
ism (the veil of ignorance with a high but not maximum level of 
risk aversion), there would be a number of dogs, above which 
the loss of that amount of dogs would be worse than the loss of 
one human life. 
The quasi-maximin principle is coherent with a lot of our 
moral intuitions. And there is a second way to arrive at this 
principle. 
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Fact 4: There might be situations where we can decrease 
someone’s well-being with a huge amount (drive him into ex-
treme poverty) in order to increase the worst-off position with 
a negligible small amount.   
Moral intuition 4: Efficiency is important to some degree. 
Empathy might have a tendency to give absolute priority to 
improving the worst-off individual, which results in a maximin 
strategy. But if we value efficiency, we would not sacrifice too 
much well-being.
Universal ethical principle 4: This equals quasi-maximin 
prioritarianism (principle 3). We should maximize the quality 
of life of all sentient beings, giving a strong priority to increase 
the lowest values of well-being. In other words: we should 
maximize the quality of life of the worst off individuals, unless 
this is at the expense of much more well-being of others.
In summary: a rational approach of impartiality (the veil of 
ignorance) with a high but not maximum risk aversion (need for 
safety) coheres with an emotional approach of empathy with a 
low but non-zero need for efficiency. These are two approaches 
resulting in the same quasi-maximin prioritarian principle.
This principle has two disadvantages. As a first problem, 
the qualities of life are very difficult to measure and compare. 
All we have is our empathy, our scientific knowledge, and our 
imagination. We have to try placing ourselves in the position of 
others, by using empathy, or by imagining that we could be the 
other individual, with all his or her needs and feelings. So the 
“emotional” method of empathy and the “rational” method of 
the veil of ignorance are actually two rules of thumb to make 
educated guesses about the order of the qualities of life of dif-
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ferent individuals. Empathy and imagination are virtues to be 
developed and already allow us to move quite far. 
A second disadvantage is that the level of priority given to 
the worst-off (in other words: the level of risk aversion or the 
need for efficiency), is in some sense arbitrary. The level is 
somewhere between 0 (sum-utilitarianism with zero risk aver-
sion) and 1 (maximin-utilitarianism with maximum risk aver-
sion). However, I believe our coherent picture is strong enough 
to withstand this objection. The arbitrariness is less worse than 
overriding a coherent set of strong moral intuitions. The good 
thing is that no-one has a strong preference to a sharp level of 
priority. No-one says the value should be 0,748. It’s more like 
a fuzzy range that we prefer. So we can and should be a bit 
tolerant to the levels of priority that other moral agents would 
prefer, and this means we can be flexible and could come to a 
democratic or mutual consensus between all moral agents. But 
once we have set a level of priority, we should apply it consis-
tently in all relevantly similar cases.
The quasi-maximin prioritarianism is the basic framework 
of a coherent ethical system of animal equality. All sentient 
beings are in some sense equal from an impartial perspective 
such as behind a veil of ignorance. It is a consequentialist ethic, 
because it only looks at outcomes of qualities of life. Giving a 
level of priority for the worst-off positions, some people (true 
consequentialists) might prefer to stop the construction of a 
coherent ethical system here. However, there are some more 
intuitions that do not nicely fit in the prioritarian ethic. We first 
discuss an intuition related to an ethic of care, and next an intu-
ition related to an ethic of rights.
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Fact 5: There is a possible situation where I have to choose 
between a sentient being I hold dear and one or more other un-
known sentient beings, e.g., in a burning house dilemma, where 
I have to choose between saving my child or other individuals 
from the flames 
Moral intuition 5: I am allowed to help the person I hold 
dear.
Universal ethical principle 5: It is allowed to be partial in 
all situations where someone is involved whom you hold dear 
(with whom you have a personal relationship or strong feelings 
of empathy), as long as we tolerate similar levels of partiality of 
everyone else. This principle of tolerated partiality trumps the 
above prioritarian principle to some degree, but not too much.
Burning house dilemmas such as “Your child or the dog?” 
(Francione, 2000) are often used to counter animal equality. 
But here we introduced a new principle of tolerated partiality, 
which hides a new kind of equality. In the burning house, I 
would save my child instead of someone else. But all individu-
als in the house are equal if I would tolerate your choice to save 
someone else. A white racist would say that it is immoral to 
save black children from the house instead of white children. 
A speciesist would say that it is immoral to save someone be-
longing to another species. But if someone has an emotional 
connection with a dog, we should tolerate his choice to save 
the dog. Saving a dog instead of a human, saving a mentally 
disabled orphan instead of a mentally normal child, or saving 
your lover instead of two unknown persons, might be violations 
of the quasi-maximin principle. But I think we are allowed to 
violate this principle to some degree. Also here we could try 
to reach a democratic or mutual consensus between all moral 
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agents, about the degree of violation that is allowed. We should 
apply this degree of partiality consistently in all situations.
Fact 6: The organ transplantation problem. There is a pos-
sible situation, where five patients in a hospital would die un-
less we sacrifice an innocent person against his will and use 
five of his organs for transplantations. This would be allowed 
according to prioritarianism. 
Moral intuition 6: I (and most people) feel emotional dis-
tress and restraint to sacrifice this one person against his will. 
We should not sacrifice someone, even if prioritarianism is vio-
lated and even if someone I hold dear is one of the patients in 
the hospital. So this intuition trumps both prioritarianism and 
tolerated partiality.
There are a lot of other moral dilemmas where we can use 
someone without his/her consent as merely means to save oth-
ers. Torturing someone in order to gain information about a 
bomb, throwing someone (a sentient being such as a mentally 
disabled human) in front of a trolley in order to block the trol-
ley that is about to kill other people, using someone as a shield 
against bullets, using someone as a slave, using someone in 
medical experiments, terror bombing civilians in order to de-
moralize the enemy, raping someone, killing and eating some-
one (cannibalism), trafficking,… All these situations generate 
moral intuitions that are very coherent if we translate them into 
the following deontological principle (an extension of Kantian 
ethics).
Universal ethical principle 6: All sentient beings have a 
basic right not to be used as merely means to someone else’s 
ends. A victim is used as merely means, when two conditions 
are met. 1) A moral agent causes the victim a “disrespectful 
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harm” against its will. A disrespectful harm means a treatment 
as property or commodity (see Francione, 2000) or a violation 
of bodily integrity. 2) The presence of the victim is required 
in order to reach the ends. The latter is an important criterion 
because there are moral dilemmas whereby you are allowed to 
cause harm to someone in order to save others. In those dilem-
mas, the presence of the victim was not required in order to 
save the others.
This principle is coherent with the notion of respect, which 
is next to empathy an important moral virtue, and it is coherent 
with the notion of intrinsic value (the opposite of instrumental 
value) as well.
The ethical principle of the basic right trumps both the prin-
ciple of priority and the principle of tolerated partiality. But the 
basic right is not absolute: if the principle of priority is strongly 
violated (if thousands of sentient beings will die), then a ba-
sic right might be violated (this corresponds with a need for 
efficiency). As with the above principles, this level of viola-
tion can be determined on the basis of a democratic or mutual 
consensus among moral agents. And here we have flexibility 
as well: there are different levels of harm, there is a morally 
relevant gradation in someone’s ends (from the vital needs of 
many sentient beings to the luxury ends of one individual), and 
there is a gradation in the level of sentience and mental capaci-
ties. These gradations could be coupled. For example: a being 
with higher levels of morally relevant mental capacities has a 
stronger claim to this basic right.
Let’s briefly apply this principle to the “least harm” objec-
tion against veganism (Davis, 2003). Suppose that a meat eater 
can kill and eat one cow, whereas a vegan needs a crop field to 
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get the same amount of nutrients. Suppose using that crop field 
accidently kills five mice. The meat eater causes least harm, 
but he violates the basic right of the cow, which is worse. The 
mice are not used as merely means, so therefore veganism re-
mains the morally better choice. (For further criticism on the 
least harm argument of Davis, see Matheny, 2003, and Lamey, 
2007).
We now arrive at an ethical system with three principles of 
equality. The first is based on impartiality (interchangeability 
of sentient beings) and results in a form of prioritarianism. The 
second is a tolerated partiality, whereby we tolerate the choices 
of others to save those they prefer. From this tolerated partiali-
ty, the individuals in a burning house inherit a “tolerated choice 
equality.” This principle weakly trumps the first principle. The 
third principle is a basic right equality, and this trumps the two 
former principles to a strong but not absolute degree. The three 
principles are related to respectively a consequentialist ethic of 
well-being and justice, a feminist ethic of care, and a deonto-
logical ethic of rights. 
These three principles imply veganism. Consider a dairy 
cow in the livestock industry and a human who likes to eat 
cheese. Start with the veil of ignorance. In one situation, dairy 
cows are not bred, so we can only be a human being, who has 
a quality of life equal to 10. In the second situation, this human 
enjoys the cheese (his quality of life increases to 11), but the 
cow has a miserable life (suffering in the livestock industry, 
early death,…). So her quality of life equals 3. According to 
quasi-maximin prioritarianism, the first situation is preferred. 
If you’d choose the second situation, from behind the veil of 
ignorance, you have probability ½ to end up in the worst-off 
position. (According to sum-utilitarianism, the second situa-
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tion is better.) Tolerated partiality is also violated: if we prefer 
the enjoyment of cheese above the use of the cow, we should 
also tolerate the other option: breeding women and using their 
breast milk to make cheese for cows (suppose the cow likes 
human cheese). This we would not tolerate. The third principle 
is also violated, because the cow in the livestock industry is 
used as merely means (her bodily integrity is violated and she 
is treated as property).
With these three principles, we arrive at a coherent system 
that best fits our strongest moral intuitions. Some intuitions 
based on speciesist judgments are not compatible with this sys-
tem of animal equality. These intuitions are too weak and can-
not be incorporated without introducing highly arbitrary and 
artificial constructions, so we have to dismiss these speciesist 
intuitions as being moral illusions. Although our theory im-
plies veganism, it still allows for some partiality (the tolerated 
partiality meets our intuitive preference for some individuals). 
However, there is one serious problem remaining.
Fact 7: Predators need meat in order to survive. If predators 
cannot use other sentient beings as merely means, they will all 
become extinct. If principles 4, 5, and 6 were universalized to 
predator animals, this would imply that they have to become 
extinct. 
Moral intuition 7: Predators are allowed to hunt and hence 
violate the basic rights and well-being of prey. It would be a 
tragedy if they became extinct. It is not easy to formulate a 
clear principle that is coherent with this intuition as well as 
with the intuitions that we encountered before. If we suppose 
that biodiversity has a moral value, then we have the following 
option.
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Universal ethical principle 7: If a sufficiently large group 
of sentient beings became by an evolutionary process depen-
dent on the use of other sentient beings for their survival, they 
are allowed to use other sentient beings for that purpose (until 
feasible alternatives, that don’t violate basic rights, are found). 
If we suppose that biodiversity has moral (intrinsic) value, 
and if we define biodiversity as the diversity of everything that 
is the direct product of evolutionary processes, then this sev-
enth principle becomes coherent with the value of biodiversity. 
So predators and their behavior contribute to biodiversity and 
we should not destroy that biodiversity.
This principle is also coherent with a “triple-N-principle,” 
which refers to the three values “natural, normal and neces-
sary” of a carnist ideology (Joy, 2009). This connection works 
if we define natural as: behavior that is a direct consequence of 
a process of evolution (genetic mutation and natural selection). 
So it refers to an “evolutionary process.” Normal means that 
the behavior happens a lot, so it refers to a “sufficiently large 
group.” And necessary means that those beings would die if 
they no longer exhibit that behavior. This refers to “dependency 
for survival.”
Putting the three criteria together, natural+normal+necessary, 
means that a lot of biodiversity would be lost when the behav-
ior stopped. And a lot of biodiversity has a lot of moral value, 
sufficiently enough to trump the basic right. Predation is nor-
mal, natural, and necessary, so it is allowed (as long as there are 
no feasible alternatives), even if it violates the basic right. For 
humans, eating animal products is not necessary (according to 
the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics), so we are not allowed 
to violate the basic rights of animals. Organ transplantation (by 
sacrificing a sentient being against his will) is not allowed ei-
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ther, because it is a violation of the basic right and it is not 
normal and natural (it is necessary though). 
Note that this value-of-biodiversity principle is completely 
unrelated to the value-of-sentience principles discussed before, 
although we could compare biodiversity as an intrinsically 
valuable property of ecosystems, with sentience as an intrinsi-
cally valuable property of sentient beings. In itself, the biodi-
versity principle seems arbitrary, but it is coherent with lots of 
our intuitions. For example: moving around and killing insects 
(by accident) is considered allowed, even if scientists are able 
to demonstrate that insects are sentient. But the 3-N-principle 
says that moving around is natural, normal, and necessary be-
havior of animals.
Finally, we also have situations where predators attack us 
or beings that we hold dear. Our intuition say we are allowed 
to defend ourselves and others, and we have a stronger duty to 
protect some individuals with whom we have special relation-
ships. All sentient beings have the right to defend themselves 
or others, they have the right to be partial in such decisions, as 
long as they respect similar kinds of partiality of others (see 
principle 5) and as long as biodiversity is not threatened. If we 
wish, we could also add that we have a duty to protect all beings 
that have (or will develop) moral agency or rationality. Those 
rational beings not only feel their interests, but they also know 
and understand their interests. This rationality applies to most 
human beings, except, for example, seriously mentally disabled 
human orphans. This satisfies people’s intuitions that we have 
a duty to protect humans from predators. (But if we say that 
we have a duty to protect mentally disabled humans whereas 
we do not have a duty to protect non-human animals, because 
all humans have a higher moral status than non-humans, then 
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we become too partial. This kind of speciesism, like racism or 
sexism, is a kind of partiality and arbitrariness that we cannot 
tolerate.)
This completes the process. We now have a theory of animal 
equality, with clear and coherent universalized ethical princi-
ples that best fit our strongest moral intuitions, and without too 
many arbitrary elements.
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